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1 Introduction
In the years 1975-2000, the US and UK experienced sharp increases in wage
inequality and rapid labor market deregulation. Aghion et al. (2001) argue
that these two phenomena are related because of skill-biased technological
change. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation through political
economy as follows: Economic integration creates political pressure to allow
the cooperation of firms to speed up economic growth. To offset the resulting
decrease in income, the labor market will be deregulated.
This paper models economic integration as a political process. I consider
an economic union, where firms are subject to oligopolistic competition, but
attempt to improve their productivity through in-house R&D. The level of
profits depends on how much firms can cooperate in price settlement. I char-
acterize the policy makers in the economic union by a hypothetical planner
that can deregulate the product market (i.e. to press the profit margins
down) through anti-trust policy, and regulate the labor market through im-
posing an effective minimum wage for (unskilled) labor (either directly, or
through supporting labor unions). Lobbies representing workers and firms
attempt to influence the planner for prospective policy. In this set up, R&D-
based growth plays a crucial rule, for the product and labor markets would
be always fully deregulated in an equilibrium with no growth. Finally, in this
framework, economic integration is equivalent to the case where the planner
accepts new regions (and consequently, new firms) as members to the union.
The growth effects of regulation depend decisively on the structure of
economy. Where the same technology is used both in production and in
R&D, the economy behaves as if the same final good were used both in
consumption and in R&D. In that specific case, labor market regulation (e.g.
the minimum wage) decreases profits, incentives to invest in R&D and the
growth rate (cf. Peretto 1998). In this study, I assume that there is different
technology for production and R&D.1 With this specification, there can be
a positive dependence between the minimum wage and technological change
through cost-escaping R&D as follows. With higher wages, firms have more
incentives to improve the productivity of labor through R&D (cf. Palokangas
1996, 2000, 2004). This increases investment in R&D and the growth rate.
1I take this to the extreme so that R&D employs only labor, for simplicity.
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There is also some empirical evidence on a positive relationship between
R&D and labor market regulation through high wages and unemployment.
Caballero (1993) and Hoon and Phelps (1997) show that changes in unem-
ployment and productivity growth are positively associated.
Except cost-escaping, there has been also other attempts to explain a
positive wage-growth relationship. Cahuc and Michel (1996) (using an OLG
model), as well as Agell and Lommerud (1997) (using an extensive game
framework) show that minimum wages create an incentive for workers to ac-
cumulate human capital. Meckl’s (2004) assumes efficiency wages for both
production and R&D and argues the following. The greater the size of the
high-wage sector (e.g. the R&D sector), the higher is unemployment gener-
ated by efficiency wages. On the other hand, the greater the relative size of
the R&D sector, the higher is the growth rate of the economy. Despite of
these alternative explanations, I stick to cost-escaping, because it provides a
direct link from rents to incentives to improve technology.
I organize the remainder of this study as follows. In section 2, I present
the institutional setting of the study as an extended game. As a part of this
game, I construct specific models for households in section 3, firms in 4 and
for the economic union in 5. Finally, I analyze the political equilibrium in
section 6 and economic integration in section 7.
2 The setting
I consider an economic union that contains a number J of similar regions.2
A member country of the union is comprised of a smaller number (< J) of
these regions. Each region j ∈ {1, ..., J} possesses fixed amounts L and N of
skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.3 To examine the political economy
of growth and economic integration, the model is then composed as follows:
(i) All firms produce goods from skilled and unskilled labor. The oligopolis-
tic competition of the firms determines prices in the economic union.
2The assumption on similar regions is admittedly strong, but with asymmetric regions
there can be multiple equilibria in the model.
3With some more complication, it is possible to get the same results on the assumption
that unskilled workers can transformed into skilled workers at some cost. Cf. Section 4 in
Palokangas (2005).
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(ii) Firms invest in R&D to escape production costs. Only skilled labor is
used in R&D.
(iii) The planner of the union accepts new members to the union and regu-
lates (a) the labor market through imposing an effective minimum wage
for (unskilled) labor and (b) the product market through allowing the
firms to cooperate in price settlement. I call the labor market deregu-
lated, if there is full employment and no effective minimum wage, and
the product market deregulated, if the profit margins are pressed to the
minimum through anti-trust policy. The planner has its own interests
and it is lobbied by interest groups that represent workers and firms.
(iv) Because the new members have access to the same technology and must
adopt the same institutions as the old members, economic integration
can be characterized by the increase in the size J of the economic
union. An expansion of the union intensifies competition in the product
market. Any opposition to economic integration manifests itself as an
upper limit that the political process sets for the economic union.
I use the common agency model (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986,
Grossman and Helpman 1994a, and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997) to
establish a political equilibrium with the following sequence of decisions:
1. Worker and employer lobbies make their offers to the planner (section
6). These offers relate the lobbies’ prospective political contributions
to the planner’s policy.
2. The planner regulates firms’ market power, sets the minimum wage and
accepts new members to the economic union (Section 5).
3. Firms decide how much to invest in R&D (Subsection 4.2).
4. Each firm decides on its output given its expectations on the behavior
of the other firms (Subsection 4.1).
5. The households decide on their consumption (Section 3).
This extended game is solved by backward induction.
3
3 Output, consumption and labor supply
3.1 Production technology
In region j ∈ {1, ..., J} of the economic union, a single firm (hereafter firm
j) produces good j from labor with technology
yj = Bjnj, (1)
where yj output, nj labor input in production and Bj is the productivity
parameter. I assume that all products j ∈ {1, ..., J} are perfect substitutes,
for simplicity.4 The total supply of the composite good in the economic
union, C, is the sum of regional outputs yj:
C =
J∑
j=1
yj. (2)
The average productivity of the economic union is given by
B
.
=
1
J
J∑
j=1
Bj. (3)
Technology (1), (2) and (3) has the useful property that with symmetry
throughout the regions, nj = n for all j, total consumption is determined by
C
∣∣∣
nj=n
= JnB. (4)
Because consumption per region, C/J , is then independent of the size J of
the economic union, there are no scale effects on consumption. In this case,
economic integration is motivated only by rents in the goods or labor market.
3.2 Households
All households in the economic union share the same preferences and take
income, the prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave
as if there were a single representative household for the whole economic
4With some complication, it is possible to use a CES function here for the same purpose.
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union. The household chooses its flow of consumption C to maximize its
utility starting at time T , ∫ ∞
T
(log C)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ,
where θ is time, C consumption and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time prefer-
ence. Noting (2), this utility maximization leads to the Euler equation5
E˙/E = r − ρ with E .= pC = p
J∑
j=1
yj, (5)
where p the consumption price, E total consumption expenditure, r the inter-
est rate and E˙ = dE/dt. Because in the model there is no money that would
pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize
the households’ total consumption expenditure in the economic union, E , at
the constant number J of regions.6 This and (5) yield
E = J, p = E
/ J∑
j=1
yj = J
/ J∑
j=1
yj, r = ρ = constant > 0. (6)
3.3 The labor market
Skilled labor is used both in production and R&D, but unskilled labor only
in production. I assume that technology in production is characterized by
the CES unit cost function
c(wj, vj), cw > 0, cv > 0, cww < 0, cvv < 0, cwv > 0. (7)
where vj and wj are the wages for skilled and unskilled labor, respectively,
and the subscripts w and v denote the partial derivatives with respect to
wj and vj, respectively. Following empirical evidence, I assume that the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is less than one:
ccwv
cwcv
< 1. (8)
5Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1994b).
6With this normalization, the equilibrium price p and the equilibrium wage w are
independent of the size of the economic union, J .
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The market for skilled labor is competitive, but I characterize labor mar-
ket regulation by the assumption that the planner sets the minimum wage
wj for unskilled labor. By duality, the equilibrium condition for the market
of skilled labor and the full-employment constraint for unskilled labor can be
constructed as follows:
L = cv(wj, vj)nj + lj = cv(wj/vj, 1)nj + lj, (9)
N ≥ cw(wj, vj)nj = cw(wj/vj, 1)nj, (10)
where nj composite labor input in production, and lj labor input in R&D.
4 Firms
4.1 Competition in the product market
Following Dixit (1986), I assume that each firm j anticipates the reaction of
the other firms k 6= j by
dyk/dyj = ϕyk/yj for k 6= j, (11)
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the firms’ market power. If ϕ = 0, the
firms behave in Cournot manner, taking each others’ output level as given.
The higher ϕ, the more the firms can coordinate their actions and the higher
price they can charge. The planner can decrease (increase) ϕ by intensifying
(weakening) its competition and anti-trust policies. The product market is
fully deregulated for ϕ = 0.
I assume, for simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the economic
union, B0k = B
0 for all k. This implies symmetry, yk = y for all k. Not-
ing (6) and (11), the inverse of the anticipated price elasticity of demand for
firm j is then
φ(J, ϕ)
.
= −
[
yj
p
dp
dyj
]
yk=y
=
[
yj∑J
k=1 yk
d
∑J
k=1 yk
dyj
]
yk=y
=
1
J
[ J∑
k=1
dyk
dyj
]
yk=y
=
1
J
[
1 + ϕ
∑
k 6=j
yk
yj
]
yk=y
=
1 + (J − 1)ϕ
J
= (1− ϕ) 1
J
+ ϕ ≥ 1
J
with ∂φ/∂J = (ϕ− 1)/J2 < 0 and ∂φ/∂ϕ = 1− 1/J > 0. (12)
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Firm j maximizes its profit pij
.
= pyj − c(wj, vj)nj, where yj is output,
by its labor input nj holding the production workers’ wage wj and produc-
tivity Bj constant, given the production function (1) and the price elasticity
of the demand for output, (12). Noting (6), this maximization yields the
equilibrium conditions
c(wj, vj) =
[
p+ yj
dp
dyj
]
Bj = (1− φ)pBj = (1− φ)J∑J
j=1 yj
Bj,
pij = pyj − c(wj, vj)nj = pyj − (1− φ)pBjnj = φpyj,
c(wj, vj)nj/pij = 1/φ− 1,
J∑
j=1
c(wj, vj)nj = (1− φ)p
J∑
j=1
yj = (1− φ)J,
J∑
j=1
pij = φp
J∑
j=1
yj = φJ.
(13)
The firms’ and workers’ income shares are equal to φ and (1−φ), respectively.
Given (12), a decrease in firms’ market power ϕ or an increase in the size J
of the union intensifies competition and decreases the firm’s share φ.
Results (13) show that labor input in production, nj, can be constant,
provided that the wage wj and the profit pij change in the same proportion.
Without this property, there could not be a steady state in the model.
4.2 Research and development (R&D)
Technological change for firm j is characterized by a Poisson process qj as
follows. During a short time interval dθ, there is an innovation dqj = 1 with
probability Λjdθ, and no innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the research process. The arrival rate
Λj is in fixed proportion λ to labor devoted to R&D, lj,
Λj = λlj, λ > 0. (14)
I denote the serial number of technology in region j by tj and variables
depending on technology tj by superscript tj. The invention of a new tech-
nology raises tj by one and the level of productivity B
tj
j by a > 1. Hence,
B
tj
j = B
0
j a
tj . (15)
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During a short time interval dθ, there is a change in technology from tj to
tj+1 with probability Λjdθ, and no change with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is given by (14). The average growth rate of the level of productivity (15)
in the stationary state is in fixed proportion (λ log a) to labor in R&D, lj (cf.
Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59). This leads to the following conclusion:
Proposition 1 Research input lj can be used as a proxy of the growth rate
in region j and the average research input l = 1
n
∑n
j=1 lj as a proxy of the
growth rate for the whole economic union.
Firm j’s dividends are given by
Πj = pij − vjlj, (16)
where pij is profit, vj the skilled workers’ wage, lj labor devoted to R&D and
vjlj expenditures on R&D in region j. Firm j maximizes the present value of
its dividends (16) by its input to R&D, lj, subject to technological change,
given the wage vj. The value of firm j’s optimal program at time T is
Ω(tj, vj, pij) = max
ljs.t.(14),(16)
E
∫ ∞
T
Πje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (17)
where θ is time, E the expectation operator and r the interest rate. In the
Appendix, I prove the following:
Πj/pij = 1 + (1− a)λlj/r, vj = (a− 1)λpij/r, (18)
wj/vj = Υ(φ, lj), ∂Υ/∂φ < 0, ∂Υ/∂lj > 0,
nj = ∆(φ, lj), ∂∆/∂φ > 0, ∂∆/∂lj < 0, (19)
N ≥ Θ(φ, lj), ∂Θ/∂φ > 0, ∂Θ/∂lj < 0, (20)
where the inequality (20) is the new form of the full-employment constraint
for unskilled labor, (10).
5 The economic union
I consider a symmetric equilibrium with B0j = B
0, in which case
nj = n, lj = l, wj = w, vj = v and pij = pi.
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In that equilibrium, the full-employment constraint (20) changes into
N ≥ Θ(φ, l), ∂Θ/∂φ > 0 if ∂Θ/∂l < 0. (21)
From (13) and (20) it follows that
c(w, v)n =
1
J
J∑
j=1
c(wj, vj)nj = 1− φ, pi = 1
J
J∑
j=1
pij = φ,
c(w, v)n+ vl = c(w, v)n+ (a− 1)λlpi/r = 1− φ+ (a− 1)λlφ/r
= 1− [1 + (1− a)λl/r]φ. (22)
By (1), (6), (18) and (20), I define the present value of the expected flow of
real income per region, y, as (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)
Ψ(l, φ)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
1
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
(
1
J
J∑
j=1
yj
)
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
ye−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
Bne−r(θ−T )dθ =
B(T )n
r + (1− a)λl
=
B(T )Θ(φ, l)
r + (1− a)λl ,
∂Θ
∂lj
< 0 ⇔ ∂Θ
∂φ
> 0 ⇔ ∂Ψ
∂φ
> 0. (23)
From (19) and (22) it follows that
(1− φ)/w = c(1, v/w)n = c(1, 1/Υ(φ, l))∆(φ, l).
Differentiating the logarithm of this equation totally, and noting (19), one
obtains that skilled labor devoted to R&D, l, is an increasing function of the
minimum wage for unskilled labor, w:
dl
dw
=
cv
cΥ2︸︷︷︸
+
∂Υ
∂l︸︷︷︸
+
− 1
∆︸︷︷︸
+
∂∆
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
> 0. (24)
The workers and the firms lobby the planner which decides on the firms’
market power ϕ, the minimum wage wj = w for unskilled labor and new
members of the economic union (i.e. the size J of the union) in the limits
of the inequality ϕ ≥ 0 and the full-employment constraint (21). Thus, the
state variables of the lobbying equilibrium are (ϕ,w, J). Noting the one-
to-one correspondences (12) and (24), the firms’ market power ϕ and the
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minimum wage w can be replaced by the firms’ income share φ and labor
devoted to R&D, l, as the control variables. The constraints for these state
variables are given by φ ≥ 1/J and (21). In this setting, the product market is
regulated when the firms are able to cooperate in price settlement, φ > 1/J ,
and deregulated when they behave in Cournot manner φ = 1/J , and the
labor market is regulated with unemployment N > Θ(φ, l) and deregulated
with full employment N = Θ(φ, l).
The wages in the economic union are equal to total labor costs in pro-
duction, c(w, v)n, plus those in R&D, vl. Following Grossman and Helpman
(1994a), I assume that the planner has its own interests and collects contri-
butions Ru and Rf from the worker and employer lobbies. A member of the
worker lobby earns wages c(w, v)n + vl minus political contributions Ru. A
member of the employer lobby earn dividends Π minus political contributions
Rf . Because the effects through the the price level p can be internalized at
the level of the economic union, the worker lobby maximizes the present value
U of the expected flow of a typical worker’s real income [c(w, v)n+vl−Ru]/p,
and the employer lobby maximizes the present value F of the expected flow
of a typical firm’s real dividends (Π − Rf )/p at time T . Noting (18), (22)
and (23), these targets can be defined as follows:
U
(
l, φ(J, ϕ), Ru
)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
c(w, v)n+ vl −Ru
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= Ψ[c(w, v)n+ vl −Ru]
= Ψ(l, φ)
{
1− [1 + (1− a)λl/r]φ−Ru
}
, (25)
F
(
l, φ(J, ϕ), Ru
)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Π−Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = Ψ[Π−Rf ]
= Ψ
{
[1 + (1− a)λl/r]pi −Rf
}
, (26)
where
U(l, φ, Rf ) + F(l, φ, Rf ) = (1−Ru −Rf )Ψ(l, φ). (27)
Noting (23), the present value the expected flow of the real political con-
tributions at time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
Ru +Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = Ψ(l, φ)(Ru +Rf ). (28)
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Given this and (27), I specify the planner’s utility function as follows:
G
(
l, φ(J, ϕ), Ru, Rf
)
= G(l, φ, Ru, Rf )
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
Ru +Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ + ζwU(l, φ, Ru) + ζfF(l, φ, Rf )
= Ψ(l, φ)(Ru +Rf ) + ζwU(l, φ, Ru) + ζfF(l, φ, Rf )
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1)U(l, φ, Ru) + (ζf − 1)F(l, φ, Rf ), (29)
where constants ζw ≥ 0 and ζf ≥ 0 are weights of the worker’s and the firm’s
welfare in the government’s preferences, respectively.
Grossman and Helpman’s (1994a) objective function (29) is widely used in
models of common agency and it has been justified as follows. The politicians
are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the contributions
from the public, Ru + Rf , but because they must defend their position in
general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the interest groups
U(l, φ, Ru) and F(l, φ, Rf ) into account directly. The linearity of (29) in
Ψ[Ru +Rf ] is assumed, for simplicity.
6 The political equilibrium
The workers’ and employers’ lobbies try to affect the planner by their con-
tributions Ru and Rf . The contribution schedules are therefore functions of
the planner’s policy variables:
Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ). (30)
The planner maximizes its utility function (29) by (l, φ), given the contri-
bution schedules (30) and the constraints (12) and (21). Following proposi-
tion 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Ru(l, φ) and Rf (l, φ)
and policy (l, φ) such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ru and Rf are non-negative but no more than the con-
tributor’s income.
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(ii) The policy (φ, l) maximizes the planner’s welfare (29) taking the con-
tribution schedules Ru and Rf as given,
(l, φ) ∈ arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
G(l, φ, Ru
(
l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
;
(iii) The worker lobby (employer lobby) cannot have a feasible strategy
Ru
(
l, φ) (Rf
(
l, φ)) that yields it a higher level of utility than in equi-
librium, given the planner’s anticipated decision rule,
(l, φ) = arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ)
)
,
(l, φ) = arg max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)
)
. (31)
(iv) The worker lobby (employer lobby) provides the planner at least with
the level of utility than in the case it offers nothing Ru = 0 (Rf = 0),
and the planner responds optimally given the other lobby’s contribution
function,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
) ≥ max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), 0
)
,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
) ≥ max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
G
(
l, φ, 0, Rf (l, φ)
)
.
Noting (30) and (31), the planner’s utility function (29) changes into
G(l, φ) .= G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ))
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1) max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ))
+ (ζf − 1) max
(l, φ) s.t. (12) and (21)
F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)),
∂G/∂l = ∂Ψ/∂l, ∂G/∂φ = ∂Ψ/∂φ. (32)
The Lagrangean for the maximization of the planner’s utility function
(32) by (l, φ) subject to the elasticity constraint (12) and the full-employment
constraint (21) is given by
H = G(l, φ) + η[φ− 1/J ] + ε[N −Θ(φ, l)], (33)
where the multipliers ε and ϑ are subject to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
η[φ− 1/J ] = 0, η ≥ 0, ε[N −Θ(φ, l)] = 0, ε ≥ 0. (34)
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Noting (20), (23), (32) and (33), the first-order conditions for the maximiza-
tion of the planner’s utility are the following:
∂H
∂φ
=
∂G
∂φ
+ η − ε∂Θ
∂φ
=
∂Ψ
∂φ
+ η − ε∂Θ
∂φ
= 0, (35)
∂H
∂l
=
∂G
∂l
− ε∂Θ
∂l
=
∂Ψ
∂l
− ε∂Θ
∂l
= 0. (36)
7 Economic integration
If the size of the union, J , is small, then φ = 1/J . In that case, by (33) and
(34), η > 0 and ∂H/∂J = η/J2 > 0 hold true. If the union is large enough,
J > 1/φ, then , and by (23), (34), (35) and (36), it is true that
φ >
1
J
, η = 0, ε =
∂Ψ
∂φ
/
∂Θ
∂φ
> 0, N = Θ,
and ∂H/∂J = η/J2 ≡ 0. These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The planner has no incentives to prevent economic integra-
tion (i.e. the increase of J), ∂H/∂J = η/J2 ≥ 0. In a small union, the
product market is deregulated (φ = 1/J). In a large union, the product mar-
ket is regulated (φ > 1/J) and the labor market deregulated (Θ = N).
Both current income and the growth rate increase the planner’s welfare.
Because integration increases competition and improves efficiency, it does
not harm the planner. Since competition increases the demand for labor in
production, then, in a large union with product market deregulation, a large
proportion of labor is devoted to production and only a small proportion to
R&D. Because this leaves very little space for R&D and economic growth, the
planner must relax product market deregulation and allow firms to cooperate.
For the reason that product market regulation boosts economic growth, labor
market regulation is no more needed for that purpose. Consequently, in a
large union, the labor market is deregulated to increase current income.
In a small economic union with product market deregulation φ = 1/J ,
noting (20), (23), (34), (35) and (36), there are two possibilities:
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(a) The present value of the expected flow of real income, Ψ, does not attain
its maximum in the unemployment regime:
∂Ψ
∂l
< 0, Θ(1/J, l) = N, ε =
∂Ψ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂Θ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
> 0.
In that case, the labor market is deregulated.
(b) The present value of the expected flow of real income, Ψ, attains its
maximum in the unemployment regime: Θ < N, ε = 0,
∂Ψ
∂l
= 0, 0 =
∂ log Ψ
∂l
=
1
n︸︷︷︸
+
∂Θ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
+
(
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
a− 1)λ
r + (1− a)λl︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
.
In that case, the labor market is regulated.
Together with Proposition 2, these results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 In a small union with product market deregulation, the la-
bor market is either deregulated or regulated. When the product market is
deregulated and the labor market regulated, economic integration will reverse
this at some stage so that the product market will be regulated and the labor
market deregulated.
8 Conclusions
This paper examines an economic union with a large number of regions, each
producing a different good. The union expands by integrating new regions.
Firms improve their productivity through investment in R&D. The less there
are firms in the union or the more they can coordinate their actions, the more
they earn profits. Both workers and firms lobby the planner which determines
the minimum wage for unskilled workers and the firms’ market power and
decides on new members to the union. The main findings of the paper can
be summarized the follows.
High current income and a high growth rate increase the planner’s welfare.
Labor and product market regulation are growth-enhancing as follows:
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(a) A higher minimum wage increases the unit cost of production and de-
creases output and income. With a higher unit cost of production, the
firms have more incentives to increase productivity through R&D. This
speeds up R&D and economic growth.
(b) Producer market power decreases production and income. With labor
market deregulation (i.e. with full employment), this transfers labor
from production to R&D. Consequently, R&D and the growth rate
increase.
In a small economic union, there is very little competition and high pro-
ducer market power even without product market regulation. In that case,
the planner has to deregulate the product market in order to raise income.
Because integration promotes competition and increases the demand for la-
bor in production, then, in a large union with product market deregulation,
a large proportion of labor is devoted to production and only a small propor-
tion to R&D. Consequently, there is very little space for R&D and growth,
and the planner must relax product market deregulation. Because product
market regulation boosts economic growth, labor market regulation is no
more needed for that purpose. Consequently, in a large union, the labor
market is deregulated to increase current income.
Appendix
From (13) and (15) it follows that
pi
tj+1
j /pi
tj
j = B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j = a. (37)
The Bellman equation corresponding to (17) is given by7
rΩ(tj, vj, pij) = max
lj
{
Πj + Λj
[
Ω(tj + 1, vj, pij)− Ω(tj, vj, pij)
]}
= max
lj
{
pij − vjlj + λlj
[
Ω(tj + 1, vj, pij)− Ω(tj, vj, pij)
]}
. (38)
The first-order condition corresponding to this is given by
λ
[
Ω(tj + 1, vj, pij)− Ω(tj, vj, pij)
]
= vj. (39)
7cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Wa¨lde (1999).
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I try the solution
Πj = βjpij, βj ∈ (0, 1), Ω = Πj/δj, (40)
in which dividends Πj is in fixed proportion βj to profits pij, and the subjective
discount factor δj > 0 is independent of income pij. Given (37) and (40), one
obtains
Ω˜
.
= Ω(tj + 1, vj, pij) = βjpi
tj+1
j /δj = aβjpi
tj
j /δj = aΩ(tj, vj, pij). (41)
Inserting this and (40) into (38), one obtains
r = Πj/Ω + λlj
(
Ω˜/Ω− 1) = δj + (a− 1)λlj
and
δj = r + (1− a)λlj > 0. (42)
From (40) and (16) it follows that
vjlj = pij − Πj = (1/βj − 1)Πj = (1− βj)pij. (43)
Inserting (40), (41), (42) and (43) into (39), one obtains
(a− 1)λ = λ(Ω˜/Ω− 1) = vj/Ω = vjδj/Πj = (1/βj − 1)δj/lj
= (1/βj − 1)[r/lj + (1− a)λ].
Noting (14), (40), (42), this equation defines the function
Πj/pij = βj = 1 + (1− a)λlj/r > 0. (44)
Inserting this into (43) yields
vj = (1− βj)pij/lj = (a− 1)λpij/r. (45)
Noting (7), (13), (43) and (44), one obtains
nj =
(1
φ
− 1
) pij
c(wj, vj)
=
(1
φ
− 1
)pij
vj
vj
c(wj, vj)
=
(1/φ− 1)lj
1− βj
vj
c(wj, vj)
=
1/φ− 1
(a− 1)λ
r
c(wj/vj, 1)
.
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This implies
log nj = log(1− φ)− log φ− log c(wj/vj, 1)− log[(a− 1)λ/r]. (46)
Differentiating the full-employment condition for skilled labor, (9), and equa-
tion (46) totally, one obtains(
njcwv cv
cw/c 1/nj
)(
d(wj/vj)
dnj
)
= −
(
1 0
0 1/[(1− φ)/φ]
)(
dlj
dφ
)
,
where, by (8), it is true that
A .=
∣∣∣∣ njcwv cvcw/c 1/nj
∣∣∣∣ = cwv − cwcvc = cwcvccwv︸︷︷︸
+
[ccwv
cwcv
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]
< 0.
This defines the functions
wj
vj
= Υ(φ, lj),
∂Υ
∂φ
=
cv
(1− φ)φA < 0,
∂Υ
∂lj
= − 1
njA > 0, (47)
nj = ∆(φ, lj),
∂∆
∂φ
= − njcwv
(1− φ)φA > 0,
∂∆
∂lj
=
cw
cA < 0. (48)
Given (47), the full-employment constraint (10) changes into
N ≥ cw
(
Υ(φ, lj), 1
)
∆(φ, lj)
.
= Γ(φ, lj)
.
= Θ(φ, lj),
∂Θ
∂φ
= cww︸︷︷︸
−
∂Υ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+ cw︸︷︷︸
+
∂∆
∂φ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂Θ
∂lj
= cww︸︷︷︸
−
∂Υ
∂lj︸︷︷︸
+
+ cw︸︷︷︸
+
∂∆
∂lj︸︷︷︸
−
< 0. (49)
Results (44), (45), (47), (48) and (49) prove (18) and (20).
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